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NOTE
CAN TAXPAYERS STAND
DISCRIMINATION?: LACK OF STANDING
AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT PERMITS THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO FUND
DISCRIMINATION WITHIN RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
REGINA N. KALEYt
INTRODUCTION
In August 1998, I was working as a therapist and residential
counselor for Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children . .. in
Louisville. I could never have foreseen that by the end of the
month I would be riding an emotional roller-coaster that would
end with my being fired on Oct. 23.1
Alicia Pedreira wrote these words after Kentucky Baptist
Homes for Children ("KBHC") fired her from her position as a
Family Specialist at one of its facilities.2 KBHC is a government-
funded Baptist organization that cares for juvenile offenders and
abused or neglected youth.' There, Alicia hoped to gain
experience under a well-known clinician while counseling
adolescents in a special unit for behavior-disordered boys.
KBHC became alarmed when a picture of Pedreira and her
partner appeared in an amateur photo contest at the Kentucky
State Fair.' The organization fired Pedreira because of her
' J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2007,
Fordham University.
1 Alicia Pedreira, People for the American Way, http://www.insideout.org/
documentaries/faith/pop/pedreira.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
2 Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 725 (6th Cir.
2009).
Id.
Pedreira, supra note 1.
Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 725.
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homosexual lifestyle, which it claimed undermined its core
Christian values. Fellow clinicians and social workers were
outraged by KBHC's behavior and have stood by Pedreira in her
plight.7 Still, the government continues to fund organizations
like KBHC that fire employees who do not conform to the
organization's religious values." How can the government fund
such discrimination?
The Supreme Court has recognized that "total separation [of
church and state] is not possible in an absolute sense," and as a
result, "[s]ome relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable."' Today, as economic troubles,
natural disasters, and failures in education become more
prevalent, political leaders have embraced the help of religious
organizations to alleviate these problems. As a result, the
government has created funding programs that aid religious
institutions in fighting the problems that plague the nation. 0
To validly fund religious organizations, the government must
abide by the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, which
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."" The authors of the Constitution "did
not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state
religion."12  More broadly, the Establishment Clause prohibits
any law "respecting an establishment of religion."'3  The
Supreme Court has noted that while a law respecting a certain
religion is not always as easily identified as one establishing a
certain religion, respecting is just as dangerous since it could be
the first step toward establishing a religion.'4 Thus, the Court
engages in careful analysis to ensure that statutes and
6 See id.
Pedreira, supra note 1.
* Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857
(W.D. Ky. 2008), rev'd, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
10 For example, the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives, established under President George W. Bush, sought to advance societal
goals by providing aid to religious organizations. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed.
Reg. 8499 (Jan. 21, 2001). Under President Barack Obama, the office has become the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. See Exec. Order
No. 13,498, 74 Fed. Reg. 6533 (Feb. 5, 2009).
n U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
12 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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governmental actions do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Often, the Court applies either the Lemon test from Lemon v.
Kurtzman" or Justice O'Connor's endorsement test from her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.'" The Lemon test has
three components: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; (2) the primary effect of the statute must be one that
neither advances nor prohibits religion; and (3) the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."
According to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch, a
statute or conduct violates the Establishment Clause when it
endorses or disapproves of a particular religion. 8 Under these
two tests, the government may be able to provide aid to religious
institutions without respecting any particular religion as long as
religious organizations use the money for the secular programs
that they operate, such as a soup kitchen or an adolescent
pregnancy counseling service.19
Despite the protections that the Court has given to the
Establishment Clause, the Court in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos held
that religious organizations are free to discriminate on a
religious basis in hiring.20 In Amos, the Court held that although
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
religion,2 1 religious organizations are exempt from following Title
VII and are free to engage in discrimination even when filling
secular positions like that of a building engineer." As a result,
through the government's funding programs, tax dollars reach
religious groups that engage in employment discrimination.
While workers like Alicia Pedreira suffer, the government claims
that it does not respect certain religions when it provides aid to
religious organizations that hire only members of their particular
faith.
For two reasons, the executive branch in particular is
responsible for funding this discrimination. First, the Supreme
Court's decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
15 Id. at 612-13.
16 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
a See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 623 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20 See 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
22 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
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Inc. to deny taxpayer standing to challenge executive branch
spending permits the executive branch to spend taxpayers'
money unchecked.23 Through this ruling, the Supreme Court
makes it nearly impossible for taxpayers to claim that executive
branch expenditures violate the Establishment Clause. Second,
the executive branch interprets the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act2 4 ("RFRA") to justify employment discrimination
within federally funded religious organizations. RFRA
established that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability."" The executive branch claims that
requiring religious organizations to refrain from religious
employment discrimination burdens their free exercise of religion
and violates RFRA.
Part I of this Note focuses on the standing limitation. Part
L.A examines the Supreme Court's limitation on taxpayer
standing and how it has prevented taxpayers from challenging
employment discrimination within government-funded
institutions. Part I.B argues that because taxpayers cannot
challenge executive branch conduct, the executive branch is free
to fund discrimination and organizations that misuse
government money in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Part I.C recommends three approaches that taxpayers may take
to achieve standing to challenge employment discrimination
within government-funded religious organizations.
Part II of this Note examines RFRA. Part II.A discusses the
passage of RFRA and the executive branch's argument that
RFRA justifies employment discrimination within government-
funded religious organizations. Part II.B argues that the
executive branch's reliance on the Free Exercise Clause to justify
religious discrimination is unconvincing because it ignores the
requirements of the Establishment Clause. Finally, Part II.C
recommends three specific responses to the executive branch's
RFRA argument.
" See 551 U.S. 587, 608-09 (2007).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
25 Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
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I. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CAN FUND DISCRIMINATION
BECAUSE TAXPAYERS Do NOT HAvE STANDING TO CHALLENGE ITS
EXPENDITURES
To satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III
of the Constitution, a plaintiff must establish standing.2 6
Standing requires a plaintiff to "allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief."27 In addition, the injury
must be concrete and particularized, not merely conjectural or
hypothetical." Requiring standing ensures that a litigant is
entitled to have his or her case heard by the court.2 9 Standing is
also important because it preserves the separation of powers by
limiting the power of the judiciary to hear only cases where real
injuries are likely to be redressed by the court's relief.30
Specifically, the requirement that the injury bear a causal
connection to the defendant's action confines "the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context."3 '
In general, standing limits "the floodgates of litigation" by
allowing only cases where the courts actually can resolve a
person's real injury.32
In Frothingham v. Mellon, the Court found that generally, a
federal taxpayer lacks standing to challenge government funding
appropriations unless he is capable of showing that he "sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury . .. and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally."3  While Frothingham upheld
standing for local or municipal taxpayers whose interests were
26 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the judicial power of the Supreme
Court to "[clases" and "[clontroversies"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968).
27 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
21 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
2 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612 (1989).
3o See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60.
s' Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
32 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (17th
ed. 2010).
33 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). The plaintiff asserted standing to challenge the
Maternity Act, which provided funding for the purpose of reducing "maternal and
infant mortality and protect[ing] the health of mothers and infants." Id. at 478. The
plaintiff claimed that she had standing to challenge the Act because she was a
taxpayer who would suffer an injury when her taxes were used in a way she deemed
unconstitutional, but the court denied the claim. See id. at 486.
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"direct and immediate," it denied federal taxpayers standing to
challenge funding appropriations that they thought
unconstitutional.3 4
Since Frothingham, the Court has found that taxpayers have
a limited ability to challenge congressional appropriations. In
1968, the Court in Flast v. Cohen finally created an exception to
the general rule laid down in Frothingham.6 In Flast, taxpayers
claimed that a federal statute providing for the expenditure of
funds on textbooks and other materials used in parochial schools
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. There,
the Court found that when deciding whether a litigant is the
appropriate party to bring a suit, "it is both appropriate and
necessary . .. to determine whether there is a logical nexus
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated." More specifically, the Court described two aspects
of the nexus as it applied to citizens asserting standing as federal
taxpayers.38  According to the Court, the taxpayer first must
show "a logical link between [taxpayer] status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked."3 9 The Court explained that it
would be logical for a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality
of congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution." Second, the Court found
that a taxpayer must show "a nexus between that status and the
precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged" by
showing that "the challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the
enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress
by Art. I, s 8."1 The Court held that the taxpayers met both of
these requirements by challenging congressional taxing and
spending power and by asserting that the challenged taxing and
spending exceeded constitutional limitations because it violated
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
I Id. at 486-87.
35 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 83.
36 Id. at 85-86.
37 Id. at 102.
3 Id. at 102-03.
39 Id. at 102.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 102-03.
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Constitution.4 2 Thus, the Court distinguished the taxpayers from
those in Frothingham who simply asserted that Congress had
exceeded its general powers." While Flast opened the door to
taxpayer standing, the Court subsequently was reluctant to
expand its application beyond its facts, particularly when
taxpayers challenged pure executive branch expenditures rather
than congressional appropriations."
A. Limited Taxpayer Standing
After Flast, the Court granted standing strictly where the
taxpayer challenged congressional action under the taxing and
spending power. For example, in Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., the
Court held that a taxpayer did not have standing to challenge the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") when it
conveyed seventy-seven acres of land to a church pursuant to the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act.4 5 The Court
found that unlike the taxpayers in Flast, the taxpayers in Valley
Forge failed the first part of the test for standing because they
were not challenging the constitutionality of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act or any congressional
action, but rather the particular action of HEW, an executive
agency.46
Despite the strict holding in Valley Forge, the Court upheld
taxpayer standing in Bowen v. Kendrick because it found a close
relationship between the challenged executive branch action and
Congress's power to tax and spend.4 7 In that case, taxpayers first
challenged the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act
("AFLA")," which established a federal grant program to provide
funding to religious and other institutions that administered
counseling on adolescent sexuality and pregnancy, but restricted
42 See id. at 103.
1 See id. at 105.
" See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007).
* 454 U.S. 464, 468 (1982).
"See id. at 479. The Court found that the taxpayers additionally failed the
Flast test because even if they were construed to have challenged congressional
action, the conveyance would be pursuant to power under the Property Clause in
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and not the congressional power to tax and spend.
See id. at 480.
' 487 U.S. 589, 619-20 (1988).
" 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10a (2006).
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grants to organizations that provided abortion services.49  The
Court rejected the taxpayers' claim that the AFLA was invalid on
its face, and found that the statute was valid under the Lemon
test.s0 Alternatively, taxpayers made an as applied challenge to
the statute, meaning that they challenged the constitutionality of
specific grants that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
made pursuant to the AFLA." Even though here, taxpayers
challenged the action of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, a member of the executive branch, the Court held that
the AFLA was "at heart a program of disbursement of funds
pursuant to Congress' taxing and spending powers."5 2 Therefore,
the taxpayers met the Flast exception because there existed "a
sufficient nexus between the taxpayer's standing as a taxpayer
and the congressional exercise of the taxing and spending
power."5 As a result, the Court remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether or not these specific grants
violated the Establishment Clause.54
1. The Supreme Court Denies Taxpayers Standing To
Challenge Executive Expenditures
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., the
Court certified that the Flast exception would go no further than
it did in Kendrick.5 Hein involved a dispute over President
George W. Bush's creation of the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives within the Executive Office of
the President." The purpose of the Office was to ensure that
faith-based community groups would be eligible to compete for
federal financial assistance, as long as they did not use funding
4 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593.
'0 See id. at 602, 616. First, the Court found that the AFLA was primarily
motivated by the clear secular purpose of eliminating social and economic problems
associated with adolescent pregnancies. See id. at 602. Second, the Court found that
the funding program's primary effect neither advanced nor prohibited religion since
there was no requirement that grantees be affiliated with any particular religion.
See id. at 604. Third, the Court found that even though the funding program
required the government to oversee organizations and ensure that the organizations
use the money in accordance with the Establishment Clause, there was no excessive
government entanglement with religion. See id. at 615-16.
* See id. at 619.
52 Id. at 619-20.
53 Id.
5 See id. at 620-21.
5 See 551 U.S. 587, 609-10 (2007).
6 See id. at 593-94.
202
2010] CAN TAXPAYERS STAND DISCRIMINATION?
toward any inherently religious activities such as worship,
religious instruction, or proselytization." No congressional
legislation authorized the Office or specifically appropriated
money for the Office's activities." Rather, the Office was funded
by "general Executive Branch appropriations."" In Hein,
taxpayers claimed that speeches and conferences related to the
program violated the Establishment Clause because they
"praised the efficacy of faith-based programs in delivering social
services."" The Court contrasted the expenditures used to fund
the Office with those in Flast, which were made pursuant to an
express congressional mandate and specific congressional
appropriation." The Court found that unlike the taxpayers in
Flast, the Hein taxpayers had not established a sufficient nexus
between their status as taxpayers and the congressional power to
tax and spend.62 As a result, the Court strictly construed the
Flast exception to apply only to funding made in accordance with
specific legislative action. The Court upheld taxpayer standing
in Kendrick by distinguishing Hein's pure executive spending
from the AFLA's program of disbursement of funds that Congress
had created, authorized, and mandated pursuant to its taxing
and spending powers." On the other hand, it relied heavily on
Valley Forge for its proposition that specific congressional
legislation pursuant to the taxing and spending powers is
necessary to establish a sufficient nexus between taxpayer status
and the constitutional challenge.
2. An Inability To Challenge Executive Branch Expenditures
Has Resulted in an Inability To Challenge Employment
Discrimination
The Supreme Court's ruling in Hein has severely limited
taxpayers' ability to bring Establishment Clause challenges in
cases of religious employment discrimination within
5' See id. at 594.
' See id. at 595.
59 Id.
6 Id. at 592.
61 See id. at 603.
62 See id. at 604-05.
6 See id. at 604.
Id. at 607 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619-20 (1988)).
* See id. at 605.
203
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 49:195
organizations that receive funding from the executive branch.6
In particular, two appellate court decisions involving religious
employment discrimination illustrate the hardships that
taxpayers face: In re Navy Chaplaincy6 7 and Pedreira v. Kentucky
Baptist Homes for Children.6 8 In In re Navy Chaplaincy, a group
of Protestant Navy chaplains alleged that the Navy's retirement
system favored Catholic chaplains in violation of the
Establishment Clause.6 ' The complaining chaplains conceded,
however, that they themselves were not among the chaplains
who suffered the alleged discrimination.70 As a result, they
asserted standing pursuant to an injury as taxpayers.7 ' The
court explained that although there was a statute that
established the Navy Chaplaincy Corps, no legislative enactment
expressly authorized expenditures to be used for the Navy's
retirement funds.72 The court also found that a challenge to the
statute that established the chaplaincy was too broad since the
taxpayers were not challenging the existence of the chaplaincy
itself. 3 Thus, the court held that in light of Hein, the taxpayers'
claim did not fit into the narrow Flast exception because no
specific congressional act directed money toward the challenged
behavior.7 4
Similarly, in Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for
Children, taxpayers alleged an Establishment Clause violation
after KBHC fired Alicia Pedreira for not conforming to the
I Hein has limited taxpayers' ability to bring Establishment Clause challenges
based on claims other than employment discrimination, but this Note discusses only
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
Nicholson, 536 F.3d 730, 741 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that taxpayers did not have
standing to challenge funding of Chaplain Service of the Veterans Health
Administration); Hinrichs v. Speaker of House of Representatives of Ind. Gen.
Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that taxpayers did not have
standing to challenge funding of Indiana House of Representatives' "Minister of the
Day" program).
67 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
- 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
69 534 F.3d at 758.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 762.
73 See id.
" See id. Although In re Navy did not involve Executive Branch appropriations,
the case is still relevant because it demonstrates how Hein has limited taxpayer
standing in religious employment discrimination cases. It will also be relevant to the
discussion in Part I.C, which discusses alternative ways for taxpayers to achieve
standing after Hein.
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organization's Baptist values. 5 The court dismissed Pedreira's
religious discrimination claims. Alternatively, several
taxpayers filed a complaint alleging that the government funds
provided to KBHC violated the Establishment Clause because
they "were used to finance staff positions which were filled
according to religious tenets, and to provide services designed to
instill Christian values and teachings in the children.""
According to both the district and appellate courts, the taxpayers
failed to meet the Flast exception for federal taxpayer standing.
The district court found that Hein precluded relief because only
general executive branch expenditures reached the various
Kentucky agencies that contracted with KBHC to provide
children's services. While the court of appeals acknowledged
that specific federal legislation governing Social Security and
other income programs authorized federal funding for states to
provide foster care and maintenance for children, it found that
the taxpayers failed to allege how these federal programs were
related to the constitutional violation. 9 The court explained that
the taxpayers did not meet the Flast nexus because the federal
provisions simply contemplated child care, not unconstitutional
religious indoctrination.so The court distinguished this case from
Kendrick, where the plaintiffs alleged a nexus between specific
provisions of the AFLA prohibiting grants to organizations that
offered abortion services and a violation of the religion clauses."
In contrast, the district and appellate courts reached
different determinations on whether the plaintiffs had alleged
state taxpayer standing. In denying the state taxpayer claim,
the district court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, which states that the Flast
analysis also applies to state taxpayers who bring Establishment
' See 579 F.3d 722, 724-25 (6th Cir. 2009).
76 Id. at 727-28. The court dismissed Pedreira's discrimination claim because a
Title VII plaintiff must allege that a religious aspect of her conduct motivated her
employer's decision to terminate her; Pedreira, however, "[did] not allege that her
sexual orientation [was] premised on her religious beliefs or lack thereof." Id. at 728.
" Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857
(W.D. Ky. 2008), rev'd, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
78 See id. at 861.
79 See Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 730-31.
80 See id. at 731.
81 See id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 (1988)).
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Clause challenges. Applying Hein's nexus requirement to state
taxpayers challenging state executive branch expenditures, the
district court reasoned that state taxpayers did not have
standing because there was no nexus between any state
legislation and the alleged violation." On the other hand, the
circuit court found that the Kentucky taxpayers sufficiently
demonstrated a nexus between specific state legislation and the
Establishment Clause violation.84 The court found that the
plaintiffs pointed to specific Kentucky legislation that
appropriated money to KBHC, and therefore, the plaintiffs
"demonstrated a nexus between Kentucky and its allegedly
impermissible funding of a pervasively sectarian institution.""
Although, the state taxpayers succeeded in the circuit court,
Pedreira demonstrates the hurdles and legal complexities that
taxpayers face in alleging Establishment Clause violations.
B. The Executive Branch's Unchecked Spending Risks
Constitutional Violations
While enlisting the help of religious groups may help to solve
social problems, the executive branch's unchecked spending is
dangerous. In cases where the Court upholds funding to
religious organizations, it recognizes that society could benefit
from religious assistance. For example, in Kendrick, Congress
"recognized that legislative or governmental action alone would
be insufficient" in dealing with the adverse health, social, and
economic consequences of adolescent pregnancy. Similarly, in
Hein, the President recognized that religious groups had a role to
play in achieving public purposes." Still, allowing the executive
branch to spend money unchecked risks constitutional violations
for two reasons. First, the judiciary will not remedy
Establishment Clause injuries to taxpayers because under Hein,
the executive branch is allowed to continue funding religious
discrimination without the courts even having to consider the
82 See Pedreira, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 858-59 (citing DaimlerChrylser Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006)).
' See id. at 861.
* Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 733.
' See id.
6 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 595 (1988).
87 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593-94 (2007).
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constitutionality of this conduct under the Lemon or endorsement
tests. Second, while the Court in Hein claimed that allowing the
judicial branch to rule on executive branch activity would disturb
the separation of powers,' not giving the courts the power to
hear these cases actually disturbs the separation of powers.
1. Unchecked Spending Allows Establishment Clause
Violations
Because Hein denied taxpayers standing to challenge
executive expenditures, it is very difficult for a taxpayer to get
beyond the standing requirement and actually have the judiciary
address his or her claim. Courts dismiss cases like Pedreira and
never reach the important Establishment Clause questions
raised by the Lemon or endorsement tests."
Taxpayers' ability to bring Establishment Clause challenges
against religious discrimination is crucial because Title VII
discrimination claims are not successful. Section 702 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 exempts religious organizations from Title
VII's prohibitions against discrimination.90  In Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, the Court held that this exemption applies even
when religious organizations engage in employment
discrimination within their secular programs.91 In that case, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ran a nonprofit
facility open to the public and fired the building's engineer
because he failed to qualify for membership of the church.9 2 The
Court concluded that although the engineer held a secular
position, section 702 covered all activities of religious employers,
and as a result, the Court found no discrimination. Because
Title VII claims fail, taxpayers must fight discrimination through
Establishment Clause challenges; but, without standing,
taxpayers' efforts are futile.
* See id. at 611.
See Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856
(W.D. Ky. 2008), rev'd, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
* See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006).
a See 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987).
" Id. at 330.
* See id. at 339.
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Finally, Establishment Clause challenges are important
because funding religious discrimination is not the only
Establishment Clause violation that the government is in danger
of committing when it funds organizations like KBHC. When
religious organizations are allowed to hire only people who share
the organization's beliefs, these organizations become more likely
to use taxpayers' money for proselytization, rather than for
secular purposes. The Court in Kendrick accepted that there
exists "pervasively sectarian" institutions whose religion is "so
pervasive that a substantial portion of [their] functions are
subsumed in the religious mission."94 The Court recognized that
within these types of organizations there "is a risk that direct
government funding, even if it is designated for specific secular
purposes, may nonetheless advance" religious missions.9' This
was exemplified in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.96 In
that case, the Court evaluated a publicly financed program that
held classes at private schools for private school students." The
Court considered the fact that the teachers mostly were, or had
been, private school teachers in concluding that the private
school was pervasively sectarian." The Court found that the
teachers "may subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in
particular religious tenets at public expense."" Even though the
teachers were supposed to be teaching a secular class, the
teachers might "knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the
course to fit the school's announced goals."oo
" Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 & n.12 (1988) (quoting Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
9 Id.
9 See 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
1 See id. at 375.
9 See id.
9 Id. at 397.
100 Id. at 388. The Grand Rapids Court ultimately declared the school funding
program invalid because the schools were "pervasively sectarian." Id. The Court held
that because the schools were "pervasively sectarian," any instruction that took
place on school grounds would not be purely secular. Id. at 388-89. Grand Rapids
was overruled in Agostini v. Felton, which held that instruction taking place on
nonpublic school grounds does not necessarily imply that the instruction contains
some religious indoctrination. See 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997). Later, in Mitchell v.
Helms, the Court stated in a plurality opinion that the government should not
assume that funding private schools will necessarily violate the Establishment
Clause simply because the schools are "pervasively sectarian." See 530 U.S. 793, 826
(2000). Although the Supreme Court is hesitant to deny aid to a school simply
because it is "pervasively sectarian," Grand Rapids's acknowledgement that
teachers who subscribe to a certain religion may have difficulty leaving that religion
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Although they were the subject of Grand Rapids, schools are
not the only religious organizations whose employees could either
intentionally or inadvertently let religious doctrine influence the
services the organization provides. For example, in Kendrick, the
organizations that received funding under the AFLA were
intended to provide various services to adolescents, including
pregnancy and pregnancy prevention counseling, as well as
education on family life and problems associated with adolescent
sexual relations.101 Although the Court found the statute valid
on its face, it recognized that as the statute was applied, there
was a possibility that funding could be abused by a "pervasively
sectarian" organization that let religious tenets influence its
teaching on adolescent sexuality.10 2 Organizations like KBHC in
Pedreira, who argue that they need to hire only people with
conforming beliefs in order to retain their religious missions,
create a risk that some employees will let religious doctrine
influence the organization's secular mission. This risk results in
a greater likelihood of Establishment Clause violations because
government funding reaches a mixture of secular and religious
purposes. Taxpayers need standing to prevent these violations
from occurring.
2. Denying Taxpayers Standing Disturbs, Rather than
Upholds, the Separation of Powers
While the Court in Hein stated that granting taxpayer
standing to challenge executive actions would disturb the
separation of powers, denying standing actually causes this
disturbance. In Hein, the Supreme Court cautioned that since
"almost all Executive branch activity is ultimately funded by
some congressional appropriation, extending the Flast
exception .. . would effectively subject every federal action-be it
a conference, proclamation or speech-to Establishment Clause
challenge by any taxpayer in federal court."0 3  Further, the
Supreme Court stated that giving taxpayers standing to
challenge spending made pursuant to executive action would
out of their lessons is still a valid point in considering whether government-funded
religious institutions should be allowed to discriminate in employment.
101 See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 594.
"n See id. at 611.
13 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 610 (2007).
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"raise serious separation-of-powers concerns," as it would result
in the federal courts overly monitoring the executive branch.10 4
Both the court of appeals and the Freedom from Religion
Foundation proposed ways to grant taxpayers standing while
still limiting checks on the executive branch, but neither of these
suggestions alleviated the Court's separation of powers
concerns.os The court of appeals suggested a "zero-marginal-cost
test" that would deny taxpayer standing when the marginal cost
to the taxpayer of the alleged Establishment Clause violation is
zero.106  The court of appeals proposed that under its test a
taxpayer would not have standing to make frivolous
challenges.'07 For example, a taxpayer would not be able to
challenge a President's favorable religious reference in a speech
because the costs associated with the speech would not increase
just because the President mentioned a particular religion.'o
The Supreme Court rejected this approach because taken
literally, the test actually could "create difficult and
uncomfortable line-drawing problems."109 It discussed, for
example, that a speech-writer could have spent extra time doing
research for the purpose of using certain "religious imagery" in a
speech, and this extra time would result in having to pay the
writer more money."10 The Freedom from Religion Foundation
took a different approach and proposed that to achieve standing,
"a challenged expenditure [should] be 'fairly traceable to the
conduct alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.' ""' The
Supreme Court, however, found "little comfort in this vague and
ill-defined test" because, in its view, all executive branch
activities could be traced to some general congressional
appropriation that was financed by taxpayer money." 2
By rejecting the proposals, the Court claimed that it was
preventing an overly scrutinized executive branch; but, in reality,
the Court created an overly dominant executive branch that
gained a great deal of power at the judiciary's loss. Instead of
1" Id. at 611-12.
"15 See id. at 612-13.
106 Id. at 612.
10' See id.
108 See id.
109 Id. at 613.
n0 See id.
111 See id.
112 Id.at 613-14.
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maintaining a balance, the Court has permitted "the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of
the other" that the Framers were so cautious to avoid."' The
Court should have accepted one of the proposals or suggested its
own test. A test is necessary to prevent frivolous challenges and
still allow taxpayers a chance to challenge executive branch
expenditures in court.
C. RESPONDING TO STANDING LIMITATIONS
After Hein, citizens cannot depend on a taxpayer's injury to
assert standing. In pursuit of having their Establishment Clause
claims against the executive branch heard, taxpayers should
consider three alternate routes.
Taxpayers can achieve standing by asserting an injury other
than the government's misuse of tax money, thereby avoiding
having to satisfy the Hein Court's narrow interpretation of
Flast."4 For example, the taxpayers in In re Navy Chaplaincy
made a second standing claim, asserting that they had suffered
an injury resulting from having to endure the Navy's "'message'
of religious preference."1 15  The petitioners claimed that their
awareness of discrimination at the workplace forced them to
endure a message of discrimination similar to that invoked by
religious displays on public property.116 The court found that the
Navy was not actively communicating a religious message like
those who made public religious displays and found that the
chaplains were simply observing conduct with which they
disagreed." 7 Although the court disagreed with the chaplains'
"creative analogy,"" there is merit to the argument. The
chaplains were not simply bystander taxpayers who were
removed from the situation. They actually worked for the Navy,
personally witnessed the alleged discrimination, and had to
endure it to carry out their work."' While the court opined that
n1 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
114 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 615.
S534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
116 See id. at 763.
117 See id. at 764.
11 Id. at 765.
119 See id. at 767 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("Appellants have suffered
particularized Article III injury because they are not strangers to the Navy's 4109
program. Their membership within the Chaplain Corps and their resulting receipt of
a message of denominational preference make them comparable to a citizen who has
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allowing the plaintiffs to achieve standing through the "message"
claim "would extend the religious display and prayer cases in a
significant and unprecedented manner and eviscerate well-
settled standing limitations,"2 0 this would only occur if anyone
who observed a religious message had standing to sue. To
preserve limitations, the court could allow standing for people
like the chaplains who suffered a direct injury from close
proximity to the discrimination.121
State taxpayers, who may have an easier time establishing a
nexus between legislative action and the challenged activity, may
also be able to achieve standing. The Supreme Court held in
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno that the "rationale for rejecting
federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to
state taxpayers."122 As a result, courts have concluded that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Flast in Hein also applies to
state taxpayers.123 Still, it is often easier for state taxpayers to
establish the nexus that Flast requires because state legislation
often does what a federal administrative agency directs.'24 For
example, in Pedreira, the Sixth Circuit found that while the
taxpayers could not point to specific federal legislation that
directed money to KBHC allegedly in violation of the
Establishment Clause, the taxpayers had identified specific state
legislation that appropriated funds for child maintenance and
educational services at KBHC.12 5 Whenever possible, plaintiffs
should look for state legislation that could yield a nexus between
legislation and the challenged activity sufficient to sustain state
taxpayer standing.
personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion, such as in the religious
display cases." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
120 Id. at 764 (majority opinion).
121 See id. at 767-68 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
122 DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006).
123 See Hinrichs v. Speaker of House of Representatives of Ind. Gen. Assembly,
506 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Hein applies to state taxpayers);
Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 853, 855-56 (W.D.
Ky. 2008), rev'd, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
124 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Alicia M. Pedreira (and others) v.
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children (and others), ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION &
SOCIAL WELFARE PoL'Y, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.
org/legal/legal-update-display.cfi?id=65.
125 Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 732-33 (6th
Cir. 2009); see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 124.
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Finally, to achieve standing, taxpayers can find someone who
has suffered a direct injury and persuade him or her to bring an
Establishment Clause claim. For example, the court in In re
Navy Chaplaincy stated that if the chaplains who had actually
been discriminated against had sought standing, they would
have achieved it.126 It is uncertain why she did not, but if Alicia
Pedreira had brought an Establishment Clause challenge, she
could have achieved standing by claiming that her direct injury
was the termination of her employment. While this strategy is
definitely an option, it still would not allow the taxpayer to
directly address his or her grievance, the misuse of his or her tax
dollars through the funding of religious activities. Instead,
taxpayers would have to rely on others who perhaps are also
taxpayers, but are bringing the Establishment Clause challenge
based on a different injury.
Even if taxpayers can achieve standing, there is no
guarantee that their claims will succeed. Once taxpayers obtain
an opportunity to challenge executive spending, they still need to
defeat the government's arguments that funding discrimination
is constitutional, including the executive branch's reliance on
RFRA.
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH USES THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT To CONDONE FUNDING DISCRIMINATION
The executive branch argues that under RFRA, federally
funded religious organizations are exempt from laws that forbid
them to engage in religious employment discrimination because
these laws burden the organizations' free exercise of religion.12 7
RFRA recognizes that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise."128 RFRA states that the "[glovernment may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in
126 See 534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("If plaintiffs had alleged that the
Navy discriminated against them on account of their religion, plaintiffs would have
alleged a concrete and particularized harm sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact for
standing purposes.").
127 See, e.g., Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award
of a Grant Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 31 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 76-77 (2007) [hereinafter Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act].
128 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2006).
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furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."'2 9  Thus, RFRA establishes a strict
scrutiny test to determine whether or not a law may burden
religious exercise. Although the Court has since found that the
Act does not apply to state laws, RFRA is still valid in its
application to federal laws. 3 0 As a result, the executive branch
has used RFRA to exempt religious organizations from having to
follow federal statutes that create grants for religious groups and
condition the funding on the organization refraining from
religious employment discrimination. The executive branch
claims that these federal statutes place a burden on free exercise
of religion by forcing organizations to hire people outside of their
particular religion.
For example, the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion
explaining that requiring World Vision, a federally funded
religious organization targeted at preventing youth gangs, to
refrain from discrimination substantially burdens the
organization's free exercise of religion.' 3 ' World Vision received a
$1.5 million grant from the Office of Justice Programs ("OJP")
pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974 ("JJDPA").132 While World Vision hired only Christians,
upon approving the grant, OJP informed World Vision that it
was subject to a religious nondiscrimination provision of the
JJDPA that prohibited employment discrimination for
12 Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
130 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). In imposing its
requirements on state law, Congress relied on its power provided in section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation" that no state shall
make a law that deprives "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law" or "equal protection of the laws." Id. at 516-17 (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, §§ 1, 5). That provision includes power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause
through the Due Process Clause, which the Court has determined includes the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id. at 519 (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)). In Flores, the Court held that Congress, in
enacting RFRA, exceeded its enforcement power from section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 532. It held that while Congress could prevent
unconstitutional behavior, it could not make a substantive change to the governing
law by requiring strict scrutiny. See id. at 534. The Court held that in applying
RFRA to the states, Congress upset the separation of powers by interfering in a
decision that should be left to the judiciary. See id. at 536.
131 Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at 1.
132 See id. at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5792a (2006)).
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grantees.3 3 The Office of Legal Counsel's opinion maintains that
the nondiscrimination provision should not apply to World Vision
because it would burden the organization's religious exercise.
A. The RFRA Argument Justifies Employment Discrimination
with the Free Exercise Clause
Prior to RFRA, Employment Division v. Smithl3 4 required
only a rational basis on the part of the state to validate laws that
burden the exercise of religion. In Smith, the Court found that
two members of a Native American church were not exempt from
laws prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic drugs even though
they claimed they used the drugs for "sacramental purposes.""as
The Court applied a rational basis test to the challenged statutes
and held that the right of free exercise does not relieve a citizen
from having to obey valid laws prohibiting conduct that a state is
free to regulate.'36 Three years later, in 1993, Congress passed
RFRA,13 7 replacing the rational basis test with a strict scrutiny
test and making it more difficult for the state to enforce laws that
burden free exercise.
Since RFRA is still applicable to federal laws, 13 8 the
government has attempted to use it to exempt federally funded
religious institutions from federal laws that prohibit employment
discrimination. The World Vision opinion discussed the White
House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiative's
insistence that faith-based funding recipients "should retain
their fundamental civil rights, including their ability ... to take
their faith into account when they make employment
decisions."139 It asserted that although a statutory provision
's See id. ("No person in any State shall on the ground of... religion ... be
subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in connection with any
programs or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under
this chapter." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1))).
134 See 494 U.S. 874, 878-79 (1990).
13 Id. at 872.
136 See id. at 878-79. The Court specifically rejected a test requiring the state to
show a compelling governmental interest in the law, stating that using that type of
test in this case would produce a "constitutional anomaly" by creating "a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws." Id. at 886.
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
138 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding RFRA invalid
only as to state law).
139 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
4-5.
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attached to the World Vision grant prohibited religious
employment discrimination, under RFRA, prohibiting
discrimination would be a substantial burden on World Vision's
ability to freely exercise its religion.14 0  The Office of Legal
Counsel found that requiring World Vision to hire non-Christians
would stifle the organization's religious exercise by forcing it to
compromise its identity and strength.141 Accordingly, the opinion
did not find a compelling governmental interest that justified
prohibiting religious discrimination in World Vision's hiring
system.14 2  In a broad conclusion, the opinion claimed that
"religious organizations that administer federally funded social
services be exempted from restrictions on religious hiring under
RFRA where it is reasonably construed to require that result."143
B. Reliance on the Free Exercise Clause Does Not Justify
Discrimination
The government's interpretation of RFRA "subvert[s]
Congressional and constitutional intent in pursuit of a forbidden
goal: discrimination in hiring."'" Although Amos allows religious
organizations to discriminate on a religious basis in employment
within secular functions, the Office of Legal Counsel goes one
step further and proposes that it is acceptable for the government
to fund this discrimination with tax dollars.145 Although the
opinion relies on the Free Exercise Clause to justify
discrimination, this reliance is not convincing for two reasons.
First, the opinion ignores the Establishment Clause in its
analysis. Second, by implying that in the performance of a single
function, an organization is both exercising its religion and a
candidate for federal aid, it assumes that an organization can be
both religious and secular at the same time; however, this is a
doubtful assumption.
140 See id. at 9.
141 See id. at 17-18.
142 See id. at 22.
'n Id. at 25.
'"Charlie Savage, Bush Aides Say Religious Hiring Doesn't Bar Aid, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2008, at All (quoting Barry Lynn, President of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State).
1' Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at 1.
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The two religion clauses of the First Amendment, the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, "are
frequently in tension."'4 6 In its opinion, the Office of Legal
Counsel focused almost entirely on the burden that a
nondiscrimination statute places on World Vision's exercise of
religion while ignoring the Establishment Clause."' Under
RFRA, the definition of an "exercise of religion" includes "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief."'48 As a result, the opinion concluded
that even if World Vision's charitable works could be conceived as
noncentral to its Christian values, they would still qualify as an
exercise of religion under RFRA.149 The opinion explained that if
World Vision were required to hire without religious favor within
the federally funded program, it would not be able to freely carry
out its charitable works; in other words, it would not be able to
freely exercise its religion. 5 o The opinion established that to
receive funding, World Vision would have to alter its behavior in
a way that would prevent it from staying true to its mission, and
this would constitute a substantial burden.1 5 '
The government's argument, however, essentially pits the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause against one
another, as its protection of the former substantially inhibits the
latter. The opinion ignores the fact that government funds are
reaching religious organizations that favor their own believers.
It ignores the burdens to those who lose jobs and the burdens to
taxpayers who are forced to fund government policies that favor
certain religions. Protecting the Free Exercise Clause at the
expense of the Establishment Clause is not a noble effort because
it perpetuates discrimination that injures both employees and
taxpayers.
Further, justifying employment discrimination within
federally funded programs with the Free Exercise Clause is
unpersuasive because it implies that an organization's activities
can be considered religious and secular at the same time. For
purposes of asserting a Free Exercise Clause violation, the
'4 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
1' Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at 1.
'n See id. at 6-7.
149 See id. at 8.
1.0 See id. at 10-11.
151 See id. at 17-18.
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programming is considered to be religious enough that the
possibility of having an employee of a different religion threatens
its free exercise of religion."' On the other hand, for purposes of
qualifying for government aid, the programs are considered to be
secular enough so as not to violate the Establishment Clause.'5 3
It is contradictory for the government to consider an organization
to be both secular and religious at the same time in the
performance of a single function; however, the organization can
be both secular and religious in the performance of different
functions. The problem is that religious organizations have a
difficult time viewing any of their activities as secular, and it is
the government that chooses to call certain religious activities
"secular" to justify funding. Still, when a function has already
been deemed secular and qualifies for government aid, it cannot
change character and become religious for purposes of protecting
its free exercise of religion.
C. RESPONDING TO THE RFRA ARGUMENT
In its memorandum opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel
makes various legally dubious arguments that anti-
discrimination regulations should not apply to religious
organizations.15 4 There are three arguments that can be used to
refute the government's use of RFRA to justify discrimination.
Citizens can argue that there is a compelling governmental
interest in requiring federally funded faith-based organizations
not to discriminate in employment. The World Vision opinion
compares the governmental interest discussed in Gonzales v. 0
Centro Esperita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal' to the
governmental interest in World Vision's case, but this
comparison is poorly supported. In Centro Esperita, the Court
held that there was not a compelling governmental interest in
preventing a religious sect from ingesting an illegal hallucinogen
for sacramental use.15 6 The World Vision opinion analogizes that
just as the Court did not find a compelling interest to enforce the
drug use prohibition, there is no compelling interest that
152 See id. at 9.
13 See id. at 1-2.
" Savage, supra note 144.
'" See 546 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2006).
156 See id. at 439.
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requires courts to enforce a discrimination prohibition.'57 There
may not be a compelling interest in preventing minimal
controlled drug use in a religious service, but there is a
compelling interest in preventing the evils of discrimination and
the Establishment Clause violations that potentially flow from
such discrimination.
While the Office of Legal Counsel acknowledges that
"Congress's interest in forbidding religious discrimination in
employment is arguably stronger in the context of federally
funded programs," it dismisses this interest because many
programs do not impose nondiscrimination requirements on the
employment practices of grantees.1s The Office of Legal Counsel
simply states that since statutes exempt religious organizations
from antidiscrimination policies,'1 9 the government must not
have a very strong interest in preventing discrimination. 0 The
Office of Legal Counsel's argument is weak because even though
Congress has mistakenly ignored compelling governmental
interests in the past, the government cannot ignore its
compelling interest in preventing discrimination and
Establishment Clause violations from occurring.
The second response to the RFRA argument maintains that
enforcing antidiscrimination provisions would not substantially
burden World Vision because it is allowed to continue
discriminating, it just cannot do so with taxpayer money. This
idea is consistent with Locke v. Davey.'e' In Davey, the Court
rejected a Free Exercise challenge to a state scholarship program
that prohibited recipients from studying theology under the state
grants.16 2  There, the Court held that the program did not
substantially burden recipients' rights to practice religion
because recipients could use the grants for pursuing a secular
157 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
20.
1" Id. at 21.
"I See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (holding that Title VII does not apply to
religious organizations).
160 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
20 ("Given that many statutes exempt religious organizations from prohibitions on
religious discrimination in employment, we conclude that applying ... [a]
nondiscrimination provision to World Vision . .. would not further a compelling
government interest.").
161 See 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (2004).
162 Id. at 725.
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degree and still study theology with their own money. 63  The
Office of Legal Counsel finds the burden imposed on World
Vision to be much greater than the burden imposed in Davey
because to comply with antidiscrimination statutes, World Vision
must substantially change its behavior and alter its religious
mission.1" On the contrary, the burden imposed in Davey is
similar to the burden imposed on World Vision.'6  Like the
student in Davey, World Vision is free to pursue its religious
interests without federal funding and use the grant for secular
purposes. In Davey, the Court found that the government "[h]ad
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category."1 66 Similarly, the
government may choose not to fund those types of services that
embrace employment discrimination. Davey suggests that
religious organizations like World Vision can choose to secularize
their programs to the point where they qualify for federal aid or
else they should find other forms of funding.
Finally, challengers can argue that when religious
organizations accept government aid for a certain function, that
function is deemed "secular," and for purposes of RFRA, the
organization relinquishes any free exercise of religion argument.
The argument that RFRA allows religious organizations to
discriminate upon hiring within federally funded programs
hinges upon the assumption that these programs constitute an
exercise of religion. 6 7  Thus, to refute this argument, one can
argue either that: (1) religious organizations are not exercising
their religion when they engage in such activities; or (2) even
though religious organizations are exercising their religion, they
relinquish certain protections when the government chooses to
call them "secular" and they accept federal aid.
To argue that religious organizations are not exercising their
religion is more difficult. As noted in the World Vision opinion,
the Supreme Court has held that the exercise of religion
a See id. at 720-21.
'" See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
25.
'5 See Savage, supra note 144 ("In the same way, Mr. Lederman said, World
Vision is free to have an antigang program that hires by faith without using
taxpayer money." (quoting Marty Lederman, a Georgetown University law
professor)).
" See Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.
167 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
6-9.
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protected by the First Amendment is not limited to beliefs, but it
also includes the performance of physical acts.*8 The actions of
faith-based organizations are often backed by values that are
central to religious ideas about justice and charity.1 69 As a result,
it is difficult to argue that while these programs might fit within
the secular goals of the government, they are not exercises of
religion.
The remaining response argues that even though these
groups are exercising religion, they must accept certain
limitations on that freedom when they accept government aid.
Religious organizations that do not accept government funding
may very well succeed in claiming that prohibiting them from
employment discrimination burdens their free exercise. 70 On the
other hand, organizations that accept aid must accept limitations
on their ability to bring free exercise claims because the very
reason they are allowed to receive aid in the first place is that
their programming can be considered a "secular" goal of the
government.171 Through its funding, the government has already
given organizations like World Vision the benefits of a secular
institution.172  Even though these organizations may be
exercising their religion through charity and other forms of social
justice, they should not also be entitled to claim the benefits of
religious exercise. In return for government aid, religious
organizations should treat their programs as secularly as they
can and abandon employment discrimination. In this way, the
religious organization is still able to assert its full religious
identity in its nonsecular functions, and it can still achieve the
charitable goals that it sets out in its secular functions.
Separating secular and religious functions in this manner is the
only way that religious organizations are able to take advantage
of government aid without violating the Establishment Clause.
" See id. at 7-8; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause protected the Amish practice of sending children to school
only up to the eighth grade).
169 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
8.
170 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
171 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
172 See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 127, at
2.
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CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the government that is supposed to protect
Alicia Pedreira's rights and liberties is actually condoning the
discrimination against her. Although it may be difficult,
taxpayers should not give up the fight against the errors of the
executive branch. Taxpayers should argue for standing,
especially where state legislation yields a nexus between state
congressional action and the challenged activity. In addition,
taxpayers should attack the weaknesses of the executive branch's
arguments. While total separation of church and state may not
be possible or ideal, separation of the state from discrimination is
crucial to upholding the Constitution.
